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Abstract
Ordinary and transfinite recursion and induction and ZF set theory are used to con-
struct from a fully interpreted object language and from an extra formula a new
language. It is fully interpreted under a suitably defined interpretation. This inter-
pretation is equivalent to the interpretation by meanings of sentences if the object
language is so interpreted. The added formula provides a truth predicate for the
constructed language. The so obtained theory of truth satisfies the norms presented
in Hannes Leitgeb’s paper ’What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be)’.
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1 Introduction
Theories of truth are presented for languages. Based on ’Chomsky Definition’ (cf. [1]) a
language is assumed to be a countably infinite set of well-formed sentences, each of finite
length, and constructed out of a finite or a countably infinite set of symbols.
(i) A theory of syntax of a language is formed by symbols, and rules to construct well-formed
sentences. Symbols consist of letters, parentheses, commas, dots, constants containing
natural numbers, terms containing numerals, and logical symbols ¬ (not), ∨ (or), ∧ (and),
→ (implies), ↔ (if and only if), ∀ (for all) and ∃ (exist). If A and B are (denote) sentences,
so are ¬A, A∨B, A∧B, A→ B and A↔ B. If P (x) is a formula of a language, and XP
is a set of terms, then P is called a predicate with domain XP if P (x) is a sentence of that
language for each assignment of a term of XP into x (shortly, for each x ∈ XP ). ∀xP (x)
and ∃xP (x) are then sentences of the language. If P has several free variables x1, . . . , xm,
then P (x1, . . . , xm) is denoted by P (x), and the sentences ∀xP (x) and ∃xP (x) stand for
universal and existential closures ∀ · · · ∀P (x1, . . . , xm) and ∃ · · · ∃P (x1, . . . , xm). Symbols
may contain a lexicon of a first-order predicate logic (cf. [11, Definition II.5.2]).
An interpretation of sentences of a language is also needed.
1
(ii) A language is called fully interpreted, if every sentence is interpreted either as true or
as false, and if the interpretation of those sentences which contain logical symbols satisfy
following rules of classical logic when A and B denote sentences of the language (’iff’ means
’if and only if’): A is true iff ¬A is false, and A is false iff ¬A is true; A ∨ B is true iff A
or B is true, and false iff A and B are false; A ∧ B is true iff A and B are true, and false
iff A or B is false; A → B is true iff A is false or B is true, and false iff A is true and B
is false; A↔ B is true iff A and B are both true or both false, and false iff A is true and
B is false or A is false and B is true. If P is a predicate with domain XP , then ∀xP (x) is
true iff P (x) is true for every x ∈ XP , and false iff P (x) is false for some x ∈ XP ; ∃xP (x)
is true iff P (x) is true for some x ∈ XP , and false iff P (x) is false for every x ∈ XP .
Any first-order formal language equipped with a consistent theory interpreted by a count-
able model, and containing natural numbers and numerals, is a fully interpreted language
in the above sense. A classical example is the language of arithmetic with its standard
interpretation. Another example is the first-order language of set theory, the interpretation
being determined by the minimal model constructed in [2] for ZF set theory.
’Truth should be expressed by a predicate’ is the first requirement presented in [12] for
theories of truth. Many languages, e.g., the above mentioned, don’t have such a predicate.
Therefore we construct from such a language L, from its predicates, and from sentences
induced by an additional formula T (x) a new language L, and choose a fixed Go¨del num-
bering to its sentences. To each proper subset U of the set D of those Go¨del numbers we
construct other subsets G(U) and F (U) of D.
In Appendix it is shown that there is the smallest subset U of D which is consistent, i.e., for
no sentence A of L the Go¨del numbers of both A and ¬A are in U , and for which U = G(U).
The sentences of L whose Go¨del numbers are in G(U) or in F (U) and the symbols of L
form a language L0 that contains L. A sentence of L0 is interpreted as true iff its Go¨del
number is in G(U), and as false iff its Go¨del number is in F (U). In this interpretation L0
is shown to be fully interpreted, if the object language L is fully interpreted. If L is fully
interpreted by meanings of its sentences, so is L0, and this interpretation is proved to be
equivalent to that defined above. Moreover, the interpretations of L and L0 are compatible
in L, and T is a truth predicate of L0 when its domain XT is the set of numerals of Go¨del
numbers of all sentences of L0. This provides a theory of truth for L0. That theory is
shown to satisfy all the norms presented in [12] for truth theories.
Ordinary and transfinite recursions and inductions and ZF set theory for sets of natural
numbers are main tools in constructions and proofs. As for these tools see, e.g., [11].
2 Recursive constructions
Let L be a fully interpreted language without a truth predicate. Construct a language L0
as follows: Its base language is formed by L, an extra formula T (x) and its assignments
when x goes through all numerals. Fix a Go¨del numbering to the base language. The Go¨del
number of a sentence (denoted by) A is denoted by #A, and the numeral of #A by ⌈A⌉. If
P is a predicate of L with domain XP , then P (x) is a sentence of L for each x ∈ XP , and
⌈P (x)⌉ is the numeral of its Go¨del number. Thus T (⌈P (x)⌉) is a sentence of L0 for each
x ∈ XP , whence T (⌈P (·)⌉) is a predicate of L0 with domain XP . The construction of L0 is
completed by adding to it sentences ∀xT (x), ∃xT (x), ∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉) and ∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉), and
sentences ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) and ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) for every predicate P of L.
When a language Ln, n ∈ N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, is defined, let Ln+1 be the language which
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is formed by the sentences A, ¬A, A ∨ B, A ∧ B, A → B and A ↔ B, where A and B
go through all sentences of Ln. The language L is defined as the union of languages Ln,
n ∈ N0. Extend the Go¨del numbering of the base language to L, and denote by D the set
of those Go¨del numbers. If A is a sentence of L, denote by ’x = ⌈A⌉’ the assignment of
the numeral ⌈A⌉ of the Go¨del number #A of A into x.
Denote by P the set of all predicates of L. Divide P into three disjoint subsets.


P1 = {P ∈ P : P (x) is a true sentence of L for every x ∈ XP},
P2 = {P ∈ P : P (x) is a false sentence of L for every x ∈ XP},
P3 = {P ∈ P : P (x) is a true sentence of L for some but not for all x ∈ XP}.
(2.1)
Given a proper subset U of D, construct new subsets G(U) and F (U) of D as follows.
Define

D1(U) = {#T (x): x = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #A is in U},
D2(U) = {#[¬T (x)]: x = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #[¬A] is in U},
D1 = {#[¬∀xT (x)],#[∃xT (x)],#[¬(∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉))],#[∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉)]},
D2 = {#[∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉)],#[∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] : P ∈ P1},
D3 = {#[¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉))],#[¬(∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉))] : P ∈ P2},
D4 = {#[¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉))],#[∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] : P ∈ P3}.
(2.2)
Subsets Gn(U), n ∈ N0, of D are defined recursively as follows.
G0(U) =
{
W = {#A : A is a true sentence of L} if U = ∅ (the empty set),
W ∪D1(U) ∪D2(U) ∪D1 ∪D2 ∪D3 ∪D4 if ∅ ⊂ U ⊂ D.
(2.3)
Let A and B denote sentences of L. When n ∈ N0, and Gn(U) is defined, define

G0n(U) = {#[¬(¬A)] : #A is in Gn(U)},
G1n(U) = {#[A ∨ B] : #A or #B is in Gn(U)},
G2n(U) = {#[A ∧ B] : #A and #B are in Gn(U)},
G3n(U) = {#[A→ B] : #[¬A] or #B is in Gn(U)},
G4n(U) = {#[A↔ B] : both #A and #B or both #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in Gn(U)},
G5n(U) = {#[¬(A ∨ B)] : #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in Gn(U)},
G6n(U) = {#[¬(A ∧ B)] : #[¬A] or #[¬B] is in Gn(U)},
G7n(U) = {#[¬(A→ B)] : #A and #[¬B] are in Gn(U)},
G8n(U) = {#[¬(A↔ B)] : #A and #[¬B], or #[¬A] and #B are in Gn(U)},
(2.4)
and
Gn+1(U) = Gn(U) ∪
8⋃
k=0
Gkn(U). (2.5)
The above constructions imply that Gn(U) ⊆ Gn+1(U) ⊂ D and G
k
n(U) ⊆ G
k
n+1(U) for all
n ∈ N0 and k = 0, . . . , 8. Define subsets G(U) and F (U) of D by
G(U) =
∞⋃
n=0
Gn(U), and F (U) = {#A : #[¬A] ∈ G(U)}. (2.6)
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3 A language, its interpretations and their properties
Let L, L and D be as in Section 2, and let G(U) and F (U), U ⊂ D, be defined by (2.6).
Recall that a subset U of D is consistent if there is no sentence A in L such that both #A
and #[¬A] are in U . The existence of the smallest consistent subset U of D which satisfies
U = G(U) is proved in Appendix by a transfinite recursion method.
Definition 3.1. Let U be the smallest consistent subset of D which satisfies U = G(U).
Denote by L0 a language which is the set of all those sentences of L whose Go¨del numbers
are in G(U) or in F (U).
(I) A theory of syntax for L0 is determined by that of the object language L, by an extra
formula T (x) and its assignments added to L to construct a base language, and by
construction of sentences of L0 using ordinary and transfinite recursion methods.
3.1 Definitional interpretation
An interpretation to sentences of L0 is defined as follows.
(II) A sentence of L0 is interpreted as true iff its Go¨del number is in G(U), and as false
iff its Go¨del number is in F (U).
Lemma 3.1. Let the language L0 be defined by Definition 3.1 and interpreted by (II). Then
a sentence of L is true (resp. false) in the interpretation of L iff it is true (resp. false) in
the interpretation (II).
Proof. Let A denote a sentence of L. A is true in the interpretation (II) iff #A is in G(U)
iff (by the construction of G(U)) #A is in W iff A is true in the interpretation of L. A is
false in the interpretation (II) iff #A is in F (U) iff (by (2.6)) #[¬A] is in G(U) iff (¬A is
a sentence of L) #[¬A] is in W iff ¬A is true in the interpretation of L iff (by negation
rule) A is false in the interpretation of L.
Proposition 3.1. Let L0 be defined by Definition 3.1. Then the interpretation rules given
in (ii) of Introduction are satisfied in the interpretation (II). T is a predicate of L0 when
its domain is defined by
XT = {x : x = ⌈A⌉ , where A is a sentence of L
0}. (3.1)
Proof. We shall first derive the following auxiliary rule.
(t0) If A is a sentence of L0, then ¬(¬A) is true iff A is true.
To prove (t0), assume first that ¬(¬A) is true. Then #[¬(¬A)] is in G(U). By (2.6)
#[¬(¬A)] is in Gn(U) for some n ∈ N0. If #[¬(¬A)] is in G0(U) then #[¬(¬A)] is in W ,
so that sentence ¬(¬A) is true in the interpretation of L. This holds by the negation rule
iff ¬A is false in the interpretation of L iff A is true in the interpretation of L. Thus #A is
inW ⊂ G(U), whence A is true. Assume next that the least of those n for which #[¬(¬A)]
is in Gn(U) is > 0. The definition of Gn(U) implies that if #[¬(¬A)] is in Gn(U), then
#[¬(¬A)] is in G0n−1(U), so that #A is in Gn−1(U), and hence in G(U), i.e., A is true.
Thus A is true if ¬(¬A) is true.
Conversely, assume that A is true. Then #A is in G(U), so that #A is in Gn(U) for some
n ∈ N0. Thus #[¬(¬A)] is in G
0
n(U), and hence in Gn+1(U). Consequently, #[¬(¬A)] is
in G(U), whence ¬(¬A) is true. This concludes the proof of (t0).
Rule (t0) is applied next to prove
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(t1) Negation rule: A is true iff ¬A is false, and A is false iff ¬A is true.
Let A be a sentence of L0. Then A is true iff (by (t0)) ¬(¬A) is true iff #[¬(¬A)] is in
G(U) iff (by (2.6)) #[¬A] is in F (U) iff ¬A is false.
A is false iff #A is in F (U) iff (by (2.6)) #[¬A] is in G(U) iff ¬A is true. Thus (t1) is
satisfied.
Next we shall prove
(t2) Disjunction rule: A ∨ B is true iff A or B is true. A ∨B false iff A and B are false.
Let A and B be sentences of L0. If A or B is true, i.e., #A or #B is in G(U), there is by
(2.6) an n ∈ N0 such that #A or #B is in Gn(U). Thus #[A ∨B] is in G
1
n(U), and hence
in G(U), so that A ∨ B is true.
Conversely, assume that A∨B is true, or equivalently, #[A∨B] is in G(U). Then there is
by (2.6) an n ∈ N0 such that #[A ∨B] is in Gn(U). Assume first that n = 0. If #[A ∨ B]
is in G0(U), it is in W . Thus A ∨ B is true in the interpretation of L. Because L is
fully interpreted, then A or B is true in the interpretation of L, and hence also in the
interpretation (II) by Lemma 3.1.
Assume next that the least of those n for which #[A∨B] is in Gn(U) is > 0. Then #[A∨B]
is in G1n−1(U), so that #A or #B is in Gn−1(U), and hence in G(U), i.e., A or B is true.
Consequently, A ∨ B is true iff A or B is true.
It follows from (2.6) that
(a) #[A ∨B] is in F (U) iff #[¬(A ∨ B)] is in G(U).
If #[¬(A∨B)] is in G(U), there is by (2.6) an n ∈ N0 such that #[¬(A∨B)] is in Gn(U).
Assume that n = 0. If #[¬(A ∨ B)] is in G0(U), it is in W . Then ¬(A ∨ B) is true and
A ∨ B is false in the interpretation of L, so that A and B are false and ¬A and ¬B are
true in the interpretation of L, i.e., #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in W , and hence in G(U).
Assume next that the least of those n for which #[¬(A ∨ B)] is in Gn(U) is > 0. Then
#[¬(A∨B)] is in G5n−1(U), so that #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in Gn−1(U), and hence in G(U).
Thus, #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in G(U) if #[¬(A ∨B)] is in G(U).
Conversely, if #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in G(U), there exist by (2.6) n1, n2 ∈ N0 such that
#[¬A] is in Gn1(U) and #[¬B] is in Gn2(U). Denoting n = max{n1, n2}, then both #[¬A]
and #[¬B] are in Gn(U). This result and the definition of G
5
n(U) imply that #[¬(A∨B)]
is in G5n(U), and hence in G(U). Consequently,
(b) #[¬(A ∨ B)] is in G(U) iff #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in G(U) iff (by (2.6)) #A and #B
are in F (U).
Thus, by (a) and (b), #[A ∨ B] is in F (U) iff #A and #B are in F (U). But this means
that A ∨B is false iff A and B are false. This concludes the proof of (t2).
The proofs of the following rules are similar to the above proof of (t2).
(t3) Conjunction rule: A∧B is true iff A and B are true. A∧B is false iff A or B is false.
(t4) Implication rule: A→ B is true iff A is false or B is true. A→ B is false iff A is true
and B is false.
(t5) Biconditionality rule: A↔ B is true iff A and B are both true or both false. A↔ B
is false iff A is true and B is false or A is false and B is true.
Interpretation (II), the fact that U = G(U) and the definition (3.1) of XT imply that T (x)
is for each x ∈ XT a sentence, true or false, of L
0. Because U is nonempty, then #[∃xT (x)]
is in G0(U) by (2.2) and (2.3), and hence in G(U) by (2.6). Thus ∃xT (x) is by (II) a true
sentence of L0. If #A1 is in G(U) = U , then #T (x) is by (2.2) in D1(U), and hence in
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G(U) when x = ⌈A1⌉. This result, (3.1) and (II) imply that T (x) is true when x = ⌈A1⌉,
and hence for some x ∈ XT .
Since #[∃xT (x)] is in G(U) = U , and since U is consistent, then #[¬∃xT (x)] is not in
U = G(U). This implies by (2.6) that #[∃xT (x)] is not in F (U), i.e., by (II), ∃xT (x) is not
false. As shown above, T (x) is true for x = ⌈A1⌉. Since #A1 is in U which is consistent,
then #[¬A1] is not in U . Thus it follows from (2.2) that #[¬T (x)] is not in D2(U), and
hence not in G(U) for x = ⌈A1⌉. The above results mean by (2.6) and (II) that T (x) is
not false when x = ⌈A1⌉, and hence not false for every x ∈ XT .
The above proof shows that T satisfies the following rule.
(t6) ∃xT (x) is true iff T (x) is true for some x ∈ XT . ∃xT (x) is false iff T (x) is false for
every x ∈ XT .
∀xT (x) is false, because #[¬∀xT (x)] is in G0(U), and hence in G(U), so that #[∀xT (x)]
is in F (U) by (2.6). If #[¬A2] is in G(U) = U , then #[¬T (x)] is by (2.2) in D2(U) when
x = ⌈A2⌉. Thus #[¬T (x)] is in G(U) = U , so that ¬T (x) is true, and hence T (x) is false
when x = ⌈A2⌉, and hence is false for some x ∈ XT .
Because #[¬∀xT (x)] is in G(U) = U and since U is consistent, then #[∀xT (x)] is not in
U = G(U) , whence ∀xT (x) is not true.
It is shown above that T (x) is false when x = ⌈A2⌉. Because #[¬A2] is in U and U is
consistent, then #A2 is not in U . This implies that #T (x) is not in D1(U), and hence not
in G(U) = U , i.e., T (x) is not true when x = ⌈A2⌉, and hence not true for every x ∈ XT .
The above results imply that T satisfies the following rule.
(t7) ∀xT (x) is true iff T (x) is true for every x ∈ XT . ∀xT (x) is false iff T (x) is false for
some x ∈ XT .
It remains to show that the following properties hold.
(tt6) ∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉) is true iff T (⌈T (x)⌉) is true for some x ∈ XT . ∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉) is false iff
T (⌈T (x)⌉) is false for every x ∈ XT ;
(tt7) ∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉) is true iff T (⌈T (x)⌉) is true for every x ∈ XT . ∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉) is false iff
T (⌈T (x)⌉) is false for some x ∈ XT ;
and if P is a predicate of L with domain XP , then
(tp6) ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is true iff T (⌈P (x)⌉) is true for some x ∈ XP . ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) false iff
T (⌈P (x)⌉) is false for every x ∈ XP ;
(tp7) ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is true iff T (⌈P (x)⌉) is true for every x ∈ XP . ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) false iff
T (⌈P (x)⌉) is false for some x ∈ XP .
To begin with properties (tp6) and (tp7), consider first the case when P ∈ P1. Then P (x)
is a true sentence of L for every x ∈ XP . Since U is nonempty, then #[∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] and
#[∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] are in G0(U) by (2.2) and (2.3), and hence in G(U). Thus ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉)
and ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) are by (II) true sentences of L0.
As shown above #[∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] and #[∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] are in G(U) = U . Because U is
consistent, then #[¬(∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉))] and #[¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉))] are not in U = G(U). This
implies by (2.6) that #[∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] and #[∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] are not in F (U), and hence, by
(II), ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) and ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) are not false.
Since every true sentence of L is by Lemma 3.1 a true sentence of L0, then, by the inter-
pretation (II), #P (x) is in G(U) = U for every x ∈ XP . Thus #T (⌈P (x)⌉) is by (2.2) in
D1(U), and hence in G(U), for every x ∈ XP . Consequently, by (II), T (⌈P (x)⌉) is true for
every x ∈ XP , and hence also for some x ∈ XP .
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As noticed above, #P (x) is in G(U) = U for every x ∈ XP . Since U is consistent, then
#[¬P (x)] is not in U for any x ∈ XP . This result and (2.2) imply that #[¬T (⌈P (x)⌉)] is
not in D2(U), and hence not in G(U) for any x ∈ XP . Thus #[T (⌈P (x)⌉)] is not in F (U)
for any x ∈ XP . This means by (II) that T (⌈P (x)⌉) is not false for any x ∈ XP . As shown
above, T (⌈P (x)⌉) is true for every x ∈ XP .
The above results imply that P has properties (tp6) and (tp7) when P is in P1. The proof
in the case when P is in P2 is similar when true is replaced by false and vice versa, and
sentences with ¬ are replaced by those without ¬, and vice versa.
Assume next that P is in P3. Then P (x) is a true sentence of L for some x ∈ XP , say
x ∈ X1P , and a false sentence of L for x ∈ X
2
P = XP \ X
1
P . Since U is nonempty, then
#[∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] and #[¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉))] are in D4 by (2.2), and hence in G(U) by (2.3)
and (2.6). Thus ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) and ¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉)) are by (II) true sentences of L0.
As shown above #[∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] and #[¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉))] are in G(U) = U . Because U
is consistent, then #[¬(∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉))] and #[∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] are not in U = G(U). This
implies by (2.6) and (t0) that #[∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉)] and #[¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉))] are not in F (U),
and hence, by (II), ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) and ¬(∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉)) are not false.
Since every true sentence of L is by Lemma 3.1 a true sentence of L0 and every false sentence
of L is a false sentence of L0, then, by the interpretation (II), #P (x) is in G(U) = U for
every x ∈ X1P , and in F (U) for every x ∈ X
2
P . In the latter case #¬P (x) is in G(U) by
(2.6). But then, by (2.2), #T (⌈P (x)⌉) is in D1(U), and hence in G(U), for every x ∈ X
1
P ,
and #¬T (⌈P (x)⌉) is in D2(U), and hence in G(U), for every x ∈ X
2
P . Thus, by (II),
T (⌈P (x)⌉) is true for every x ∈ X1P , and ¬T (⌈P (x)⌉) is true for every x ∈ X
2
P .
As noticed above, #P (x) is in G(U) = U for every x ∈ X1P , and #[¬P (x)] is in G(U) = U
for every x ∈ X2P . Since U is consistent, then #[¬P (x)] is not in U for any x ∈ X
1
P and
#P (x) is not in U for any x ∈ X2P . This result and (2.2) imply that #[¬T (⌈P (x)⌉)] is not
in D2(U), and hence not in G(U) for any x ∈ X
1
P , and #[T (⌈P (x)⌉)] is not in D1(U), and
hence not in G(U) for any x ∈ X2P . Thus #[T (⌈P (x)⌉)] is not in F (U) for any x ∈ X
1
P and
#[¬T (⌈P (x)⌉)] is not in F (U) for any x ∈ X2P . This means by (II) that T (⌈P (x)⌉) is not
false for any x ∈ X1P , and ¬T (⌈P (x)⌉) is not false for any x ∈ X
2
P .
Consequently, properties (tp6) and (tp7) hold also also when P is in P3.
The proof of properties (tt6) and (tt7) is similar to that given above for properties (tp6)
and (tp7) in the case when P is in P3.
The above results imply that the interpretation rules given in (ii) of Introduction are
satisfied in the interpretation (II) of L0.
We shall derive some properties for the sets G(U) and F (U) defined by (2.6) when U is a
nonempty and consistent subset of D.
Lemma 3.2. Let U be nonempty and consistent. Then G(U) and F (U) are disjoint and
consistent.
Proof. If #A is inW , then A is by (2.3) a true sentence of L. Because L is fully interpreted,
then ¬A is not true. Thus #[¬A] is not in W , and hence not in G(U). This implies by
(2.6) that #A is not in F (U), and hence not in G0(U) ∩ F (U).
Let x be a numeral. If #T (x) is in G0(U), it is in D1(U), so that, by (2.2), x = ⌈A⌉, where
#A is in U . Because U is consistent, then #[¬A] is not in U . Thus, by (2.2), #[¬T (x)] is
not in D2(U), and hence not in G(U) when x = ⌈A⌉. This implies by (2.6) that #T (x) is
not in F (U) when x = ⌈A⌉. Consequently, #T (x) is not in G0(U) ∩ F (U).
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U is a nonempty, and as a consistent set a proper subset of D. Thus (2.3) implies that
#[¬∃xT (x)] and #[∀xT (x)] are in not in G0(U). By the proof of rules (t6) and (t7) in
Proposition 3.1 the sentence ∃xT (x) is not false, and the sentence ∀xT (x) is not true, and
hence ¬∀xT (x) is not false, so that #[∃xT (x)] and #[¬∀xT (x)] are not in F (U). Thus
none of the Go¨del numbers #[∃xT (x)], #[∀xT (x)], #[¬∃xT (x)] and #[¬∀xT (x)], are in
G0(U) ∩ F (U).
If P ∈ P, then by the proof of Proposition 3.1 the sentences ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉), ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉),
∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉) and ¬(∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉)) are not both true and false, the sentences T (⌈P (x)⌉)
are not both true and false for any x ∈ XP and the sentences T (⌈T (x)⌉) are not both true
and false for any x ∈ XT . Hence the negations of these sentences are not by (t1) both true
and false. Thus by (II), their Go¨del numbers are not in G(U)∩F (U), so that they are not
in G0(U) ∩ F (U).
The above results and the definition (2.3) of G0(U) imply that G0(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
Make the induction hypothesis:
(h0) Gn(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅ for some n ∈ N0.
If #[¬(¬A)] would be in G0n(U) ∩ F (U), then #A would be in Gn(U) and #[¬(¬A)], or
equivalently, by (t1), #A would be in F (U), so that #A would be in Gn(U) ∩F (U). This
is impossible by (h0), whence G0n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
If #[A∨B] is in G1n(U)∩F (U), then #A or #B is in Gn(U), and both #A and #B are in
F (U) by (t2), so that #A or #B is in Gn(U) ∩ F (U). This contradicts with (h0), whence
G1n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
#[A∧B] cannot be in G2n(U)∩F (U), for otherwise both #A and #B are in Gn(U), and at
least one of #A and #B is in F (U), so that #A or #B is in Gn(U)∩F (U), contradicting
with (h0). Thus G2n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
If #[A → B] is in G3n(U) ∩ F (U), then #[¬A] or #B is in Gn(U) and both #[¬A] and
#B are in F (U). But then #[¬A] or #B is in Gn(U) ∩ F (U). Thus G
3
n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅
by (h0).
If #[A ↔ B] is in G4n(U) ∩ F (U), then both #A and #B or both #[¬A] and #[¬B] are
in Gn(U), and both #[A] and #[¬B] or both #[¬A] and #[B] are in F (U). Then one of
Go¨del numbers #A, #B, #[¬A] and #[¬B] is in Gn(U) ∩ F (U), contradicting with (h0).
Consequently, G4n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
If #[¬(A∨B)] is in G5n(U)∩F (U), then #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in Gn(U), and #[A∨B] is in
G(U), i.e., #A or #B is in G(U), or equivalently, #[¬A] or #[¬B] is in F (U). Thus #[¬A]
or #[¬B] is in Gn(U) ∩ F (U). This is impossible by (h0), whence G
5
n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
If #[¬(A ∧ B)] is in G6n(U) ∩ F (U), then #[¬A] or #[¬B] is in Gn(U), and #[A ∧ B]
is in G(U), or equivalently, #A and #B are in G(U), i.e., #[¬A] and #[¬B] are in
F (U). Consequently, #[¬A] or #[¬B] is in Gn(U) ∩ F (U), contradicting with (h0). Thus
G6n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
If #[¬(A → B)] is in G7n(U) ∩ F (U), then #A and #[¬B] are in Gn(U), and #[A → B]
is in G(U), i.e., #[¬A] or #B is in G(U), or equivalently, #A or #[¬B] is in F (U). Thus
#A or #[¬B] is in Gn(U)∩F (U). This contradicts with (h0), whence G
7
n(U)∩F (U) = ∅.
#[¬(A ↔ B)] cannot be in G8n(U) ∩ F (U), for otherwise both #[A] and #[¬B] or both
#[¬A] and #[B] are in Gn(U), and #[A↔ B] is in G(U), i.e., both #[¬A] and #[¬B] or
both #A and #B are in F (U). Thus one of Go¨del numbers #A, #B, #[¬A] and #[¬B]
is in Gn(U) ∩ F (U), contradicting with (h0). Thus G
8
n(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
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Because Gn+1(U) = Gn(U) ∪
⋃8
k=0G
k
n(U), the above results and the induction hypothesis
(h0) imply that Gn+1(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅. Since (h0) is true when n = 0, it is by induction
true for every n ∈ N0.
If #A is in G(U), it is by (2.6) in Gn(U) for some n ∈ N0. Because (h0) is true for every
n ∈ N0, then #A is not in F (U). Consequently, G(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅.
If G(U) is not consistent, then there is such a sentence A of L, that #A and #[¬A] are
in G(U). Because #[¬A] is in G(U), then #A is also in F (U) by (2.6), and hence in
G(U) ∩ F (U). But this is impossible since G(U) ∩ F (U) = ∅. Thus G(U) is consistent.
If F (U) is not consistent, then #A and #[¬A] are in F (U) for some sentence A of L.
Since #[¬A] is in F (U), then #A is also in G(U) by (2.6), and hence in G(U) ∩ F (U), a
contradiction. Thus F (U) is consistent.
The main result of this subsection is a consequence of Proposition 3.1 and Lemma 3.2.
Proposition 3.2. The language L0 defined by Definition 3.1 is fully interpreted in the
interpretation (II).
Proof. Let A denote a sentence of L0. Then #A is in G(U) or in F (U). Because U is
consistent, then G(U) and F (U) are disjoint by Lemma 3.2. Thus #A is either in G(U)
or in F (U), whence A is either true or false in the interpretation (II). The interpretation
rules given in (ii) of Introduction are satisfied by Proposition 3.1.
3.2 Semantical interpretation
A semantical interpretation of a language is given by the following citation from [8, p. 2]:
”We say that a language is fully interpreted if all its sentences have meanings that make
them either true or false.”
(see also [13, p. 61]). This is the case, for instance, when models are used in the interpre-
tation. According to classical logic the interpretation rules (ii) presented in Introduction
are assumed to hold also when a language is fully interpreted by meanings of its sentences.
If all sentences of the object language L are equipped with meanings, then meanings of
the sentences of the language L0 are determined by meanings of the sentences of L, by
meaning of the sentence T (⌈A⌉), i.e., ’The sentence denoted by A is true’, and by standard
meanings of logical symbols. We shall show that if L is fully interpreted by meanings of its
sentences, then L0 is fully interpreted by meanings of its sentences, and this interpretation
is equivalent to the interpretation (II). In the proof of this result we use the results of the
following Lemmas.
Lemma 3.3. Assume that a language L is fully interpreted by meanings of its sentences,
and is without a truth predicate. Let U be as in Definition 3.1, and let V be consistent and
satisfy W ⊆ V ⊆ U . If every sentence of L0 whose Go¨del number is in V is true and not
false by its meaning, then this property is satisfied when V is replaced by G(V ).
Proof. Because V ⊆ U = G(U), then every sentence whose Go¨del number is in V , is in L0.
Given a sentence of L0, its Go¨del number is in D1(V ) iff it is of the form T (⌈A⌉), where A
denotes a sentence whose Go¨del number is in V . A is by an assumption true and not false
by its meaning. Thus the sentence T (⌈A⌉), i.e., the sentence ’The sentence denoted by A
is true’, and hence the given sentence, is true and not false by its meaning. Replacing A
by T (⌈A⌉), it follows that T (⌈T (⌈A⌉)⌉) is true and not false by its meaning.
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A given sentence of L0 has its Go¨del number in D2(V ) iff it is of the form ¬T (⌈A⌉), where
A denotes a sentence of L, and the Go¨del number of the sentence ¬A is in V . ¬A is
by a hypothesis true and not false by its meaning, and hence A is false and not true by
its meaning. Thus the sentence T (⌈A⌉), i.e., the sentence ’The sentence denoted by A is
true’, is false and not true by its meaning. Replacing A by T (⌈A⌉), we then obtain that
T (⌈T (⌈A⌉)⌉) is false and not true by its meaning. Consequently, by the standard meaning
of negation, the sentences ¬T (⌈A⌉) and ¬T (⌈T (⌈A⌉)⌉), and hence also the given sentence,
are true and not false by their meanings.
The domain XT of T , defined by (3.1), contains ⌈A⌉ for every sentence A of L. If A is a
true sentence of L, then it is by assumption true and not false by its meaning. Since #A
is in W , it is also in V , whence the sentences T (⌈A⌉) and T (⌈T (⌈A⌉)⌉) are by a result
proved above true and not false by their meanings. Thus T (x) and T (⌈T (x)⌉) are for some
x ∈ XT true and not false by their meanings. These results and the standard meaning of
the existential quantifier imply that ∃xT (x) and ∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉) are true and not false by
their meanings.
If A is a false sentence of L, then the sentence ¬A is true in the interpretation of L, and
hence true and not false by its meaning. Since #[¬A] is in W , it is also in V , so that by
a result proved above the sentence ¬T (⌈A⌉) and ¬T (⌈T (⌈A⌉)⌉) are true and not false by
their meanings. Thus the sentences ¬T (x) and ¬T (⌈T (x)⌉) are for some x ∈ XT true and
not false by their meanings, so that T (x) and T (⌈T (x)⌉) are for some x ∈ XT false and not
true by their meanings. The above results, the meaning of T , and the standard meanings
of the universal quantifier and negation imply that ¬∀xT (x) and ¬∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉) are true
and not false by their meanings. Consequently, the sentences whose Go¨del numbers are in
D1 are true and not false by their meanings.
Let P be a predicate of L with domainXP . L is by assumption fully interpreted by meaning
of its sentences. Thus P (x) is for every x ∈ XP , as a sentence of L, either true and not
false, or false and not true by its meaning. This property holds, because of the meaning
of T , for sentences T ⌈P (x)⌉), x ∈ XP . By taking also the meanings of the existential and
universal quantifiers and negation into account, it follows that the sentences whose Go¨del
numbers are in D2, D3 and D4 are true and not false by their meanings.
The above results and the definition (2.3) of G0(V ) imply that every sentence of L
0 whose
Go¨del number is in G0(V ) is true and not false by its meaning. Thus the following property
holds when n = 0.
(h2) Every sentence of L0 whose Go¨del number is in Gn(V ) is true and not false by its
meaning.
Make the induction hypothesis: (h2) holds for some n ∈ N0.
Given a sentence of L0 whose Go¨del number is in G0n(V ), it is of the form ¬(¬A), where
the Go¨del number of A is in Gn(V ). By induction hypothesis A is true and not false by
its meaning. Thus, by standard meaning of negation, its double application implies that
the sentence ¬(¬A), and hence the given sentence, is true and not false by its meaning.
A given sentence of L0 has its Go¨del number in G1n(V ) iff it is of the form A ∨ B, where
the Go¨del number of A or B is in Gn(V ). By the induction hypothesis at least one of
the sentences A and B is true and not false by its meaning. Thus, by the the standard
meaning of disjunction, the sentence A∨B, and hence given sentence, is true and not false
by its meaning.
Similarly it can be shown that if the induction hypothesis holds, then every sentence of L0
whose Go¨del number is in Gkn(V ), where 2 ≤ k ≤ 8, is true and not false by its meaning.
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The above results imply that under the induction hypothesis every sentence of L0 whose
Go¨del number is in Gkn(V ), where 0 ≤ k ≤ 8, is true and not false by its meaning.
It then follows from the definition (2.5) of Gn+1(V ) that if (h2) is valid for some n ∈ N0,
then every sentence of L0 whose Go¨del number is in Gn+1(V ) is true and not false by its
meaning.
The first part of this proof shows that (h2) is valid when n = 0. Thus by induction, it is
valid for all n ∈ N0. This result and (2.6) imply that every sentence of L
0 whose Go¨del
number is in G(V ) is true and not false by its meaning.
Lemma 3.4. Assume that a language L is fully interpreted by meanings of its sentences,
and has not a truth predicate. Then the language L0 given in Definition 3.1 has the fol-
lowing properties.
(a) If a sentence of L0 is true in the interpretation (II), it is true and not false by its
meaning.
(b) If a sentence of L0 is false in the interpretation (II), it is false and not true by its
meaning.
Proof. By Theorem 6.1 the smallest consistent subset U of D which satisfies U = G(U) is
the last member of the transfinite sequence (Uλ)λ<γ (indexed by Von Neumann ordinals)
constructed in that Theorem. We prove by transfinite induction that the following result
holds for all λ < γ.
(H) Every sentence of L0 whose Go¨del number is in Uλ is true and not false by its meaning.
Make the induction hypothesis: There exists a µ which satisfies 0 < µ < γ such that (H)
holds for all λ < µ.
Because Uλ is consistent and W ⊆ Uλ ⊆ U for every λ < µ, it follows from the induction
hypothesis and Lemma 3.3 that (H) holds when Uλ is replaced by any of the sets G(Uλ),
λ < µ. Thus (H) holds when Uλ is replaced by the union of those sets. But this union is
Uµ by Theorem 6.1 (C), whence (H) holds when λ = µ.
When µ = 1, then λ < µ iff λ = 0. U0 = W , i.e., the set of Go¨del numbers of true sentences
of L. By assumption these sentences are true and not false by their meanings. Moreover,
these sentences are also sentences of L0, since it contains sentences of L. This proves that
the induction hypothesis is satisfied when µ = 1.
The above proof implies by transfinite induction, that properties assumed in (H) for Uλ
are valid whenever λ < γ. In particular, they are valid for the last member of (Uλ)λ<γ ,
which is by Theorem 6.1 the smallest consistent subset U of D for which U = G(U). Thus
every sentence of L0, which is true in the interpretation (II), has its Go¨del number in U ,
and hence by is the above proof true and not false by its meaning. This proves (a).
To prove (b), let A denote a sentence which is false in the interpretation (II). Negation
rule implies that ¬A is true in the interpretation (II). Thus, by (a), ¬A is true and not
false by its meaning, so that by the standard meaning of negation, A is false and not true
by its meaning. This proves (b).
Now we are ready to prove the main result of this subsection.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that a language L is fully interpreted by meanings of its sen-
tences, and is without a truth predicate. Then the language L0 defined in Definition 3.1 is
fully interpreted by meanings of its sentences, and this interpretation is equivalent to the
interpretation (II).
11
Proof. Let A denote a sentence of L0. A is by Proposition 3.2 either true or false in the
interpretation (II). If A is true in the interpretation (II), it is by Lemma 3.4 (a) true and
not false by its meaning. If A is false in the interpretation (II), it is by Lemma 3.4 (b)
false and not true by its meaning. Consequently, A is either true or false by its meaning.
Thus every sentence of L0 is either true or false by its meaning, or equivalently, L0 is
fully interpreted by meanings of its sentences, and this interpretation is by the above proof
equivalent to the interpretation (II).
4 Theory DSTT and its properties
The next theorem provides for the language L0 defined in Definition 3.1 a theory of truth.
Because the interpretation of L0 can be definitional or semantical, we call that theory
definitional/semantical theory of truth, shortly DSTT.
Theorem 4.1. Assume that an object language L is fully interpreted, and is without a
truth predicate. Then the language L0 defined by Definition 3.1 is fully interpreted by (II),
and also by meanings of its sequences if L is so interpreted. Moreover, A↔ T (⌈A⌉) is true
and A↔ ¬T (⌈A⌉) is false for every sentence A of L0, and T is a truth predicate for L0.
Proof. L0 is by Proposition 3.2 fully interpreted in the interpretation (II). If L is fully
interpreted by meanings of its sequences, so is L0 by Proposition 3.3, and this interpretation
is equivalent to the interpretation (II).
Let A denote a sentence of L0. The interpretation (II), rule (t1), the definitions of D1(U),
D2(U) and G(U), and the assumption U = G(U) in Definition 3.1 imply that
– A is true iff #A is in G(U) iff #A is in U iff #T (⌈A⌉) is in G(U) and #[¬T (⌈A⌉)] is in
F (U) iff T (⌈A⌉) is true and ¬T (⌈A⌉) is false;
– A is false iff #A is in F (U) iff #[¬A] is in G(U) iff #[¬A] is in U iff #[¬T (⌈A⌉)] is in
G(U) and #T (⌈A⌉) is in F (U) iff ¬T (⌈A⌉) is true and T (⌈A⌉) is false.
The above results and rule (t5) imply that A↔ T (⌈A⌉) is true and A↔ ¬T (⌈A⌉) is false
for every sentence A of L0.
It follows from Proposition 3.1 that T is a predicate of L0. Moreover, (3.1) implies that the
domain XT of T is the set of numerals of Go¨del numbers of all sentences of L
0. Thus XT
satisfies the following condition presented in [3, p. 7]: ”In the case of the truth predicate T ,
the domain ... is taken to consist of the sentences that are meaningful and determinate, i.e.
have a definite truth value, true or false.” (In [3] numerals of Go¨del numbers of sentences
are replaced by sentences itself.) Consequently, T is a truth predicate for L0.
The next two Lemmas deal with compositionality properties of T .
Lemma 4.1. Let L0 and its interpretation be as in Theorem 4.1. Then the following
biconditionals are true for all sentences A and B of L0.
(a1) T (⌈¬A⌉)↔ ¬T (⌈A⌉).
(a2) T (⌈A ∨ B⌉)↔ T (⌈A⌉) ∨ T (⌈B⌉).
(a3) T (⌈A ∧ B⌉)↔ T (⌈A⌉) ∧ T (⌈B⌉).
(a4) T (⌈A→ B⌉)↔ (T (⌈A⌉)→ T (⌈B⌉)).
(a5) T (⌈A↔ B⌉)↔ (T (⌈A⌉)↔ T (⌈B⌉)).
Proof. Let A be a sentence of L0. Then
T (⌈¬A⌉) is true iff ¬A is true iff A is false iff T (⌈A⌉) is false iff ¬T (⌈A⌉) is true.
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T (⌈¬A⌉) is false iff ¬A is false iff A is true iff T (⌈A⌉) is true iff ¬T (⌈A⌉) is false.
Thus (a1) is true.
Let A and B be sentences of L0. Then
T (⌈A ∨ B⌉) is true iff A ∨ B is true iff A or B is true iff T (⌈A⌉) or T (⌈B⌉) is true iff
T (⌈A⌉) ∨ T (⌈B⌉) is true.
T (⌈A ∨ B⌉) is false iff A ∨B is false iff A and B are false iff T (⌈A⌉) and T (⌈B⌉) are false
iff T (⌈A⌉) ∨ T (⌈B⌉) is false.
Consequently, (a2) is true. The proof that (a3) and (a4) are true is similar.
Let A and B be sentences of L0. Then
T (⌈A↔ B⌉) is true iff A ↔ B is true iff A and B are both true or both false iff T (⌈A⌉)
and T (⌈B⌉) are both true or both false iff T (⌈A⌉)↔ T (⌈B⌉) is true.
T (⌈A↔ B⌉) is false iff A ↔ B is false iff A is true and B is false or A is false and B
is true iff T (⌈A⌉) is true and T (⌈B⌉) is false or T (⌈A⌉) is false and T (⌈B⌉) is true iff
T (⌈A⌉)↔ T (⌈B⌉) is false. Consequently, (a5) is true.
Lemma 4.2. Let L0 and its interpretation be as in Theorem 4.1. If P is a predicate of L
with domain XP , then the following biconditionals are true.
(a6) T (⌈∀xP (x)⌉)↔ ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉).
(a7) T (⌈∃xP (x)⌉)↔ ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉).
(a8) T (⌈∀xT (x)⌉)↔ ∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉).
(a9) T (⌈∃xT (x)⌉)↔ ∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉).
Proof. T (⌈∀xP (x)⌉) is true iff ∀xP (x) is true iff P (x) is true for every x ∈ XP iff T (⌈P (x)⌉)
is true for every x ∈ XP , iff (by (tp7)) ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is true. Consequently,
(a61) T (⌈∀xP (x)⌉) is true iff ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is true.
Assume that T (⌈∀xP (x)⌉) is false. If ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) would be true, then T (⌈∀xP (x)⌉) would
be true by (a61). But then T (⌈∀xP (x)⌉) would be both false and true, which is impossible
because L0 is fully interpreted. Thus ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is false. Similarly it can be shown that
if ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is false, then T (⌈∀xP (x)⌉) is false. The above results imply that
(a62) T (⌈∀xP (x)⌉) is false iff ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is false.
Results (a61), (a62) and (t5) imply that (a6) is true.
T (⌈∃xP (x)⌉) is true iff ∃xP (x) is true iff P (x) is true for some x ∈ XP iff T (⌈P (x)⌉) is
true for some x ∈ XP , iff (by (tp6)) ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is true. Consequently,
(a71) T (⌈∃xP (x)⌉) is true iff ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is true.
Result (a71) and the fact that L0 is fully interpreted imply (cf. the proof of (a62)) that
(a72) T (⌈∃xP (x)⌉) is false iff ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) is false.
As a consequence of (a71), (a72) and (t5) we obtain that (a7) is true.
Truths of (a8) and (a9) are proved similarly as truths of (a6) and (a7) when properties
(tp6) and (tp7) are replaced by (tt6) and (tt7).
Hannes Leitgeb formulated in his paper [12]: ’What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but
Cannot be)’ the following norms for theories of truth:
(n1) Truth should be expressed by a predicate (and a theory of syntax should be available).
(n2) If a theory of truth is added to mathematical or empirical theories, it should be
possible to prove the latter true.
(n3) The truth predicate should not be subject to any type restrictions.
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(n4) T -biconditionals should be derivable unrestrictedly.
(n5) Truth should be compositional.
(n6) The theory should allow for standard interpretations.
(n7) The outer logic and the inner logic should coincide.
(n8) The outer logic should be classical.
The next Theorem shows that theory DSTT satisfies these norms, and also two additional
norms. The author considers validity the extra norm (n9) as crucial to every theory of
truth.
Theorem 4.2. The theory of truth DSTT formulated in Theorem 4.1 satisfies the norms
(n1)–(n8) and the following norms.
(n9) The theory of truth should be free from paradoxes.
(n10) Truth should be explained for the language in which this very theory is expressed.
Proof. (n1): T is by Theorem 4.1 a truth predicate for the language L0 of theory DSTT.
(A theory of syntax is available, as stated in (I) after Definition 3.1).
(n2): By Lemma 3.1 DSTT proves theories of the object language L true.
(n3): T is by Theorem 4.1 a truth predicate for the language L0 of theory DSTT, and is
not subject to any restrictions in that language.
(n4): By Theorem 4.1 T -biconditionals A↔ T (⌈A⌉) are derivable unrestrictedly in L0.
(n5): Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 imply that truth in DSTT is compositional.
(n6): DSTT allows for standard interpretations. For instance, the interpretation of the
language L0 of theory DSTT by meanings of its sentences is possible if the object language
is so interpreted. Examples of such interpretations are given in Introduction.
(n7) and (n8): The interpretation rules given in (ii) of Introduction, assumed for L, and
proved for L0 in Proposition 3.1, are those of classical logic. Consequently, both the outer
logic and the inner logic are classical in DSTT.
(n9): Every sentence of L0 is either true or false in both interpretations. Thus DSTT is
free from paradoxes.
(n10): In (II) truth is explained (an interpretation is explained in English) for the language
L0 where theory DSTT is expressed. In the semantical case the interpretation is explained
by meanings of the sentences of L0.
5 Remarks
Compared with [5, 6, 7], the language for the presented theory of truth contains new
sentences, the domain of T is so chosen that it meets the requirements presented in [3],
and the collection of possible object languages L is larger. Neither compositionality results
for T nor the interpretation of L0 by meanings of its sentences, and the equivalence if this
interpretation to the interpretation (II) are presented in those papers. Also some proofs
are simplified and specified.
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As in [7], the sentences ∃x[¬T (x)] and ∀x[¬T (x)] could be added to L0 so that the bicon-
ditionals ∀x[¬T (x)] ↔ [¬(∃xT (x))] and ∃x[¬T (x)] ↔ [¬(∀xT (x))] would be true. Thus
also ¬T would be a predicate of L0.
If U is a consistent subset of D which satisfies U = G(U), but not the smallest, and if L is
fully interpreted, then T is a truth predicate for the language L0, defined as in Definition
3.1, and interpreted by (II), using that U . The so obtained theory of truth satisfies norms
(n0)–(n10). It is questionable whether there exists a proof that for such U the language
L0 is fully interpreted by meanings of its sentences when L is so interpreted.
The set U in theory DSTT is the smallest consistent subset of D which satisfies U = G(U).
Thus the sentences of L0 are grounded in the sense defined by Kripke in [10, p. 18].
In Tarski’s theory of truth (cf. [14]) the truth predicate is in every step for the language
preceding that step. The sentences of that language do not contain the truth predicate in
question. Thus the norms (n3) and (n4) are not satisfied.
Leitgeb gives in [12, p. 9] the following justification to his opinion that there cannot be
a theory of truth which satisfies all the norms presented in [12]: ”Consider a first-order
theory which conforms to these norms, such that truth is to be explained for the language
in which this very theory is expressed. From the theory of syntax the existence of a
so-called Liar sentence is derivable.” This means that the existence of a sentence A for
which A ↔ ¬T (⌈A⌉) ”follows from the syntactic axioms”, and hence is true. But also
A ↔ T (⌈A⌉) is true by (n4). Thus A is both true and false by the biconditionality rule
(t5) of classical logic, so that such a theory of truth is contradictory, whereas DSTT is not.
While the theory of syntax for the object language L can be that of a first-order theory,
the theory of syntax for the language L0 of theory DSTT is not.
In [3, Conclusions] Feferman urges ”the pursuit of axiomatizations of semantical or def-
initional approaches that have not yet been thus treated, and the close examination of
them in the light of the given criteria.” By ’the given criteria’ Feferman means Leitgeb’s
norms (n1)–(n8). The close examination of theory DSTT in the light of those criteria is
carried out above. However, neither axioms for DSTT nor an axiomatic theory of truth
conforming to norms (n1)–(n10) can be constructed. Reasons for this are found from ([4]).
6 Appendix
Before the proof of Theorem 6.1 we shall first prove auxiliary results, using the concepts
adopted in previous sections.
Lemma 6.1. Assume that U and V are consistent subsets of D, and that V ⊆ U . Then
G(V ) ⊆ G(U) and F (V ) ⊆ F (U).
Proof. As consistent sets both V and U are proper subsets of D.
Let A be a sentence of L. Definition of G(U) implies that #A is in G(U) and also in G(V )
iff #A is in W .
If #T (x) is in D1(V ), then x = ⌈A⌉, where #A is in V . Because V ⊆ U , then #A is also
in U , whence #T (x) is in D1(U).
If #[¬T (x)] is in D2(V ), then x is ⌈A⌉, where #[¬A] is in V . Because V ⊆ U , then #[¬A]
is also in U , whence #[¬T (x)] is in D2(U).
If #[∃xT (x)] is in G0(V ), then V is nonempty. Because V ⊆ U , then also U is nonempty,
whence #[∃xT (x)] is in G0(U). Consequently, #[∃xT (x)] is in G0(U) whenever it is in
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G0(V ). The similar reasoning shows that #[¬∀xT (x))] is in G0(U) whenever it is in
G0(V ). The sets D1, D2, D3 and D4 are contained in U if they are contained in V .
The above results imply that G0(V ) ⊆ G0(U). Make an induction hypothesis:
(h1) Gn(V ) ⊆ Gn(U).
The definitions of the sets Gkn(U), k = 0, . . . , 8, given in (2.4), together with (h1), imply
that Gkn(V ) ⊆ G
k
n(U) for each k = 0, . . . , 8. Thus
Gn+1(V ) = Gn(V ) ∪
8⋃
k=0
Gkn(V ) ⊆ Gn(U) ∪
8⋃
k=0
Gkn(U) = Gn+1(U).
Because (h1) is true when n = 0, then it is true for every n ∈ N0.
If #A is in G(V ), it is by (2.6) in Gn(V ) for some n. Thus #A is in Gn(U) by (h1), and
hence in G(U). Consequently, G(V ) ⊆ G(U).
If #A is in F (V ), it follows from (2.6) that #[¬A] is in G(V ). Because G(V ) ⊆ G(U), then
#[¬A] is in G(U). This implies by (2.6) that #A is in F (U). Thus F (V ) ⊆ F (U).
Denote by C the family of consistent subsets of D. In the formulation and the proof of
Theorem 6.1 below transfinite sequences indexed by von Neumann ordinals are used. A
transfinite sequence (Uλ)λ<α of C is said to be increasing if Uµ ⊆ Uν whenever µ < ν < α,
and strictly increasing if Uµ ⊂ Uν whenever µ < ν < α.
Lemma 6.2. Assume that (Uλ)λ<α a strictly increasing sequence of C. Then
(a) (G(Uλ))λ<α is an increasing sequence of C.
(b) The set Uα =
⋃
λ<α
G(Uλ) is consistent.
Proof. (a) Consistency of the sets G(Uλ), λ < α, follows from Lemma 3.2 because the sets
Uλ, λ < α, are consistent.
Because Uµ ⊂ Uν whenever µ < ν < α, then G(Uµ) ⊆ G(Uν) whenever µ < ν < α, by
Lemma 6.1, whence the sequence (G(Uλ))λ<α is increasing. This proves (a).
To prove that the set
⋃
λ<α
G(Uλ) is consistent, assume on the contrary that there exists such
a sentence A in L that both #A and #[¬A] are in
⋃
λ<α
G(Uλ). Thus there exist µ, ν < α such
that #A is in G(Uµ) and #[¬A] is in G(Uν). Because G(Uµ) ⊆ G(Uν) or G(Uν) ⊆ G(Uµ),
then both #A and #[¬A] are in G(Uµ) or in G(Uν). But this is impossible, since both
G(Uµ) and G(Uν) are consistent by (a). Thus, the set
⋃
λ<α
G(Uλ) is consistent. This proves
the conclusion of (b).
Theorem 6.1. The union of those transfinite sequences (Uλ)λ<α of C which satisfy
(C) (Uλ)λ<α is strictly increasing, U0 =W , and if 0 < µ < α, then Uµ =
⋃
λ<µ
G(Uλ)
is a transfinite sequence. It has the last member, which is the smallest consistent subset U
of D which satisfies U = G(U).
Proof. Those transfinite sequences of C which satisfy condition (C) are called G-sequences.
We shall first show that G-sequences are nested:
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(1) Assume that (Uλ)λ<α and (Vλ)λ<β are G-sequences, and that {Uλ}λ<α 6⊆ {Vλ}λ<β.
Then (Vλ)λ<β = (Uλ)λ<β.
By the assumption of (1) µ = min{λ < α | Uλ 6∈ {Vλ}λ<β} exists, and {Uλ}λ<µ ⊆ {Vλ}λ<β.
Properties (C) imply by transfinite induction that Uλ = Vλ for each λ < µ. To prove that
µ = β, make a counter-hypothesis: µ < β. Since µ < α and Uλ = Vλ for each λ < µ, it
follows from properties (C) that Uµ =
⋃
λ<µ
G(Uλ) =
⋃
λ<µ
G(Vλ) = Vµ, which is impossible,
since Vµ ∈ {Vλ}λ<β, but Uµ 6∈ {Vλ}λ<β. Consequently, µ = β and Uλ = Vλ for each λ < β,
whence (Vλ)λ<β = (Uλ)λ<β .
By definition, every G-sequence (Uλ)λ<α is a function λ 7→ Uλ from α into C. Property (1)
implies that these functions are compatible. Thus their union is by [9, Theorem 2.3.12]
a function with values in C, the domain being the union of all index sets of G-sequences.
Because these index sets are ordinals, then their union is also an ordinal by [11, I.8.10].
Denote it by γ. The union function can be represented as a sequence (Uλ)λ<γ of C. It is
strictly increasing as a union of strictly increasing nested sequences.
To show that γ is a successor, assume on the contrary that γ is a limit ordinal. Given
ν < γ, then µ = ν + 1 and α = µ + 1 are in γ, and (Uλ)λ<α is a G-sequence. Denote
Uγ =
⋃
λ<γ
G(Uλ). G is order preserving by Lemma 6.1, and (Uλ)λ<γ is a strictly increasing
sequence of C. Thus (G(Uλ))λ<γ is increasing by Lemma 6.2(a), and Uγ is consistent by
Lemma 6.2(b). Moreover, Uν ⊂ Uµ =
⋃
λ<µ
G(Uλ) ⊆ Uγ . This is true for each ν < γ,
whence (Uλ)λ<γ+1 is a G-sequence. This is impossible, since (Uλ)λ<γ is the union of all
G-sequences. Consequently, γ is a successor, say γ = α + 1. Thus Uα is the last member
of (Uλ)λ<γ, Uα = max{Uλ}λ<γ , and G(Uα) = max{G(Uλ)}λ<γ. Moreover, (Uλ)λ<γ is a
G-sequence, for otherwise (Uλ)λ<α would be the union of all G-sequences. In particular,
Uα =
⋃
λ<α
G(Uλ) ⊆
⋃
λ<γ
G(Uλ) = G(Uα), so that Uα ⊆ G(Uα). This inclusion cannot be
proper, since then the longest G-sequence (Uλ)λ<γ could be extended by Uγ =
⋃
λ<γ
G(Uλ).
Consequently, Uα = G(Uα).
Assume that U is a consistent subset of D, and that U = G(U). Then U0 = W = G(∅) ⊆
G(U) = U . If 0 < µ < γ, and Uλ ⊆ U for each λ < µ, then G(Uλ) ⊆ G(U) for each λ < µ,
whence Uµ =
⋃
λ<µ
G(Uλ) ⊆ G(U) = U . Thus, by transfinite induction, Uµ ⊆ U for each
µ < γ. This proves the last assertion of Theorem.
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